

The Romanian Population Exchange Project Elaborated by Sabin Manuilă in October 1941

by Viorel Achim

The first archival document relating to the population policy of the Romanian Government during World War II, to be published is a memorandum drawn up by Sabin Manuilă director of the Central Institute of Statistics, and addressed to Marshal Ion Antonescu, *Conducator* of the Romanian State, on October 15, 1941. This memorandum was a project for population policy, recommending population exchanges with neighboring countries so that Romania would become ethnically homogeneous. The memorandum was published in 1996 in appendix to a study on the contribution of Sabin Manuilă (1894-1964) to the ethnic demography of Transylvania in the 1930s and 1940s¹.

The researchers who published the document (Sorina Bolovan and Ioan Bolovan) presented it from the perspective of ethnic issues in Transylvania during World War II. The solution put forward by Sabin Manuilă – a Romanian-Hungarian population exchange and the establishment of an international border based on ethnicity – was seen as proof of the willingness of the Romanian authorities to settle the dispute with Hungary².

But there is more to Sabin Manuilă's memorandum, a consistent and encompassing project dealing with an issue of great interest for the wartime Government in Bucharest: turning Romania into an ethnically uniform country. The measures taken by the Antonescu regime during those years against the ethnic minorities, and a long series of other internal and external actions undertaken by Romania were directly linked to the letter's interest in attaining ethnic homogeneity.

¹ S. BOLOVAN - I. BOLOVAN, *Problemele demografice ale Transilvaniei între știință și politică (1920-1945)*. *Studiu de caz*, in C. MUREȘAN (ed.), *Transilvania între medieval și modern*, Cluj-Napoca 1996, pp. 125-131. The memorandum follows in the appendix to the present paper. Quotations from this document are not accompanied by notes.

² *Ibidem*, p. 124. Manuilă's memoir is also mentioned in I. BOLOVAN - S. BOLOVAN, *România și problema schimbului de populație în perioada interbelică*, in «România km. 0», 1, 1999, 1, pp. 99-102.

Though the policy towards the Jews, the deportations to Transnistria, and the situation of the German minority are the subjects of a relatively large number of studies, the policy of the Romanian State towards other ethnic minorities during the Antonescu regime has not been extensively researched³. This could explain why important materials, such as Manuilă's 1941 memorandum have begun to be taken into consideration only recently.

Besides Manuilă's project, only one other document with comparable content has been published so far. This is a project elaborated by the Bucharest Government in 1943, in anticipation of a population exchange between the Romanians living in the Soviet territories (in Transnistria and to the east of the Bug) and the Russians and Ukrainians living in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Danube Delta. This project is more extensive than Manuilă's (thirty pages versus ten), comprising components relating to all aspects of the contemplated population exchange, including transport, finance, the assets of the displaced, sanitary care, propaganda, and others⁴. However, the project concerns only Bessarabia and Bukovina. Manuilă's project is important because it was the first, and because Sabin Manuilă was the first to elaborate a plan for the ethnic homogenization of the entire country, the elimination of all minority populations, and the repatriation of all Romanian populations in the neighboring countries.

Manuilă's project was followed in 1941, 1942, and 1943 by similar writings by various individuals or institutions, dealing either with the entire issue or with specific aspects of ethnic homogenization. Most focus on one frontier or another, or on specific populations that might become objects of population exchange or transfer. Sometimes Manuilă's ideas are invoked in these writings, another reason why Manuilă's project of October 1941 can be considered the most significant, or at least a landmark.

Manuilă had already become one of the most appreciated Romanian demographers during the interwar period⁵. His studies on the ethnic composition

³ See D. ȘANDRU, *Bucovina și nordul Basarabiei în planurile iredentei ucrainene 1940-1944*, in «Revista istorică», 8, 1997, 3-4, pp. 203-218, and D. BANCOȘ, *Social și național în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu*, Bucharest 2000, *passim*. Although he deals with rich information on minorities in Romania, Bancoș does not distinguish a policy of ethnic homogenization in Romania during the Antonescu regime. Quite useful is the older study by D. GHERASIM, *Schimbul de populații între state*, Bucharest 1943, in which pp. 69 ff. deal with Romania.

⁴ V. ACHIM, *Proiectul guvernului de la București vizând realizarea schimbului de populație româno-ruso-ucrainean (1943)*, in «Revista istorică», 11, 2000, 5-6, pp. 395-421.

⁵ For Sabin Manuilă's life and work, see S. BOLOVAN - I. BOLOVAN, *Introduction*, in S. MANUIĂ, *Studies on the Historical Demography of Romania / Études sur la démographie*

of Transylvania and on ethno-demographic relations there were pioneering. He noted the tendency for the more rapid demographic growth of the Romanian population in relation to the minorities, as a result of greater fertility. He also noted a Romanianization of the towns, a process occurring through in-migration at a time when Romanians preponderated in the rural hinterland.

Sabin Manuilă was among the first in Romania to address the issue of the population exchange. He addressed the issue as early as 1929, in the conclusions to a study on the demographic evolution of towns and minorities in Transylvania. Here the author pleaded for a demographic policy «in tune with the interests of the Romanian nation». He spoke of the need to block the trend of emigration at any cost and to support the inflow of Romanians, to strengthen the Romanian population in border areas and weaken the «elements with a centrifugal tendency». He also stressed the «necessity of organizing a population exchange with countries where we have people of our blood, broken off the body of our nation»⁶. In 1932, Manuilă recommended the colonization of Romanians in towns with an important presence of minorities and at the borders of the country, as well as the organization of population exchanges with Yugoslavia, Hungary, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR as issues for ethnic policy⁷. At a 1935 meeting organized by the Ministry of Public Instruction, Manuilă proposed the «purification» of the western border over an area of 100 km by colonization and population exchange, namely by bringing over Romanians living in Hungary and settling them there⁸.

historique de la Roumanie, Cluj-Napoca 1992, pp. 7-17; S. BOLOVAN, *Sabin Manuilă's Contribution to the Research of Urban Population of Romania*, in «Transylvanian Review», 1, 1992, 1, pp. 56-64; L. ROMAN, *Sabin Manuilă et la démographie historique*, in «Transylvanian Review», 3, 1994, 1, pp. 47-68; L. ROMAN, *Demografia istorică în opera lui Sabin Manuilă*, in S. BOLOVAN - I. BOLOVAN (eds), *Sabin Manuilă. Istorie și demografie. Studii privind societatea românească între secolele XVI-XX*, Cluj-Napoca 1995, pp. 26-40; and V. TREBICI, *Dr. Sabin Manuilă, organizatorul statisticii științifice în România*, in S. BOLOVAN - I. BOLOVAN (eds), *Sabin Manuilă*, pp. 7-25. Some of Sabin Manuilă's writings in French and English were reprinted in S. MANUILĂ, *Studies on the Historical Demography of Romania / Études sur la démographie historique de la Roumanie*.

⁶ S. MANUILĂ, *Evoluția demografică a orașelor și minorităților etnice din Transilvania*, in «Revista pentru Știința și Reforma Socială», 8, 1929, pp. 208, 210-211.

⁷ Arhiva Națională Istorică Centrală, Bucharest (hereafter: ANIC), *Fond Sabin Manuilă*, dos. XV95 bis («Politica de populație a statului și problema minorităților etnice»).

⁸ Biblioteca Academiei Române, *Arhiva Dr. C. Angelescu*, II ms. 8 («Note luate în consfătuirea din 19 Noiembrie 1935, ținută la Casa Școalelor»), pp. 7-8.

At that time, Sabin Manuilă was still among the few intellectuals who spoke of ethnic «purification». Before 1940, political actors had not yet begun to speak in terms of ethnic purification. The predominant idea was that of integrating and assimilating the minorities. The so-called «Romanianization» of the 1920s and 1930s, which exacerbated the relations between the minorities and the state, addressed the cultural institutions of the minorities (especially in the provinces acquired by Romania at the end of the World War I), and did not yet attempt to fundamentally modify the ethnic structure of the country⁹.

But the minority issue changed radically in 1940. In that year Romania lost almost a third of its territory and population: Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were occupied by the USSR after the ultimatums of June 26 and June 28, 1940; northern Transylvania passed into the possession of Hungary after the Second Vienna Award (August 30, 1940); southern Dobruđa (Cadrilater) was ceded to Bulgaria under the Treaty of Craiova (September 7, 1940)¹⁰. In all these territories, there were strong ethnic minorities, even if these minorities did not constitute the majority in the respective provinces. The presence of these minorities had given rise to the claims of the neighboring states. In fact, Romania was the victim of territorial arrangements made by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in their areas of hegemony.

As the very integrity of the country came under deadly threat, the Romanians 'awakened' to the 'gravity' of the minority problem. If the minorities had proven a factor of dissolution, then the answer would be ethnic homogenization. Ethnic homogenization gave cohesion to the state. The idea was fostered by the political class beginning with 1940.

These were the circumstances in which Romanian politics began reckoning the solution offered by population exchanges. In July 1940 when the Axis powers forced the Romanian government into negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria, Bucharest began seeking a «definitive solution» to the problem of minorities through this means. In a statement to the press the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihail Manoilescu, noted on July 30, 1940 that «the

⁹ On the policy towards the ethnic minorities in Greater Romania, see especially I. LIVEZEANU, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Ithaca - London 1995.

¹⁰ For the territorial losses imposed on Romania in 1940, as well for the participation of Romania in World War II, see D.C. GIURESCU, *Romania in the Second World War (1939-1945)*, Boulder - New York 2000.

Government would wish to take more radical steps in order to give a definitive solution to the issue of minorities of the same blood with neighboring peoples, by new measures taken in the spirit and based on the methods of our time. Among these, a measure which yielded very good results in all countries is the population exchange»¹¹. This was the first time a Romanian top official publicly advocated population exchange.

At the negotiations with Hungary at Turnu Severin in August 1940, the Romanian party pleaded the ethnic principle as a basis instead of the territorial one. The Romanians felt that the two parties should seek a radical solution to the problem by making Romania and Hungary as ethnically homogeneous as possible. Population exchange was the proper means, and any changes in the border could only be accepted as a territorial consequence of the application of the ethnic principle and of a population exchange. The territory to be ceded would be strictly limited to what was necessary in order to settle the Hungarians leaving Romania¹². At the Second Vienna Award (August 30, 1940), the Romanian delegation reiterated this position¹³. Hungary, however, rejected this principle, which would have limited its territorial claims to a small part of Transylvania.

Sabin Manuilă joined the Romanian delegation at both the Conference in Turnu Severin and the award in Vienna. He was the one who elaborated the proposal for a Romanian-Hungarian population exchange.

The first application of the idea, however, occurred in September 1940, with the loss of Cadrilater (southern Dobrudja) to Bulgaria under the Craiova Treaty of September 7, 1940. A full and compulsory exchange of populations accompanied this transfer. Approximately 61,000 Bulgarians left from northern Dobrudja, and 100,000 Romanians from southern Dobrudja¹⁴. As a result, the political border in Dobrudja also became an ethnic border. That same autumn, the German population of southern Bukovina and Dobrudja followed. Based on an agreement between the Romanian and German governments signed on October 22, 1940, this population was repatriated to the Reich: 52,400 from southern Bukovina,

¹¹ Cf. A. SIMION, *Dictatul de la Viena*, Bucharest 1996², pp. 217-218.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 262-303; V. POP, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, Bucharest 1992, pp. 80-133.

¹³ A. SIMION, *Dictatul de la Viena*, p. 306 ff.; V. POP, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, p. 134 ff.

¹⁴ For this population exchange, see D. GHERASIM, *Schimbul de populații*, pp. 93-115; J.B. SCHECHTMAN, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, New York 1946, pp. 404-415; and D. BANCOȘ, *Social și național*, p. 82 ff.

and 13,968 from Dobrudja¹⁵. The Hungarian population living in southern Bukovina and Bessarabia was repatriated between the autumn of 1940 and the autumn of 1941, based on two agreements with Hungary. The displacement of the Hungarians from Bukovina (15,593 persons) was concluded by the middle of June 1941; the 829 who lived in Bessarabia left at the beginning of October 1941¹⁶.

Beginning in summer of 1940 Sabin Manuilă dealt with the ethnic homogenization of the country as director of the Central Institute of Statistics, which was subordinate to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (to Marshal Ion Antonescu) and was to provide the Government with the information it required. The institute played an important role in substantiating governmental policy decisions. Manuilă contributed to the population policy of the Romanian state during the war, and Marshal Antonescu and the other leaders consulted him on all issues of population policy. As director of the Central Institute of Statistics, Manuilă was also involved in preparing the documentary material in support of the borders Romania wished to win at the anticipated peace conference. The Peace Bureau (*Biroul Păcii*), set up in June 1942 at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had exactly this purpose¹⁷. One section under the Bureau dealt expressively with border and ethnic issues.

In 1940 and 1941, Sabin Manuilă elaborated several dossiers dealing with population policy. These studies, preserved in the National Archives of Romania, are all entitled *Politica de populație* (Population Policy) and were meant for government use. In the first, dated August 6, 1940, Manuilă presents his views on ethnic homogenization and population exchange at length. Manuilă observed that the idea of population exchange was born after World War I. This «raised the ethnic problem to the rank of a major international problem, [and] put forward the dissolution of the historical

¹⁵ See D. JACHOMOWSKI, *Die Umsiedlung der Bessarabien-, Bukowina- und Dobrudscha-deutschen: Von der Volksgruppe in Rumänien zur «Siedlungsbrücke» an der Reichsgrenze*, München 1984, pp. 88-110; and D. GHERASIM, *Schimbul de populații*, pp. 81-86. The figures are taken from D. JACHOMOWSKI, *Die Umsiedlung*, p. 100. Almost simultaneously, the Germans living in Bessarabia (93,318) and northern Bukovina (43,500) were being repatriated to the Reich, in the spirit of the German-Soviet treaty signed on September 5, 1940. See D. JACHOMOWSKI, *Die Umsiedlung*, pp. 64-87.

¹⁶ Cf. J. SCHIECHTMAN, *European Population Transfers*, pp. 435-436.

¹⁷ For data on this body, see I. ARDELEANU, *Biroul Păcii: proiecte privind soluționarea problemei frontierelor României și realizarea unor bune relații în Balcani (1942-1943)*, in «Europa XXI», 1-2, 1992-1993, pp. 128-132.

polyglot conglomerates and their replacement with nation states». However, the creation of pure nation states proved impossible. Some minority groups did subordinate themselves to the new states, while others were less settled and seemed to become «mere political instruments in the hands of some foreign countries that direct their action, adjust the degree of violence, and provide moral and material support». This was thought to be the cause of much internal and international unrest. Manuilă's conclusion was that only population exchanges with all neighboring countries would «lead to the ethnic homogenization of our population, [and] eliminate the frictions leading at present to international tension»¹⁸.

On December 19, 1940 Manuilă argued that the fate of the almost five million ethnic Romanians living outside the country should be a matter of governmental concern, and that those living in regions that Romania would never be able to claim should be brought into the country. He added that «the emigration of some minorities is becoming an acute problem», especially that of the German element that «very soon would become the object of a German claim of evacuation and resettlement in Germany». The space vacated by the departure of the minorities would become the field of action for a systematic population policy¹⁹.

Manuilă's politics appear in the study entitled *Politica de populație* (Population Policy), written in April 1941. Here Manuilă advocates a population policy based on a pre-established program, one that would target the fulfillment of exact tasks at optimal dates. He believed that «our historical time provides more and more opportunities to solve one aspect or another of our population problems». He also urged that the arising opportunities not be wasted. One such wasted opportunity, he wrote, was the Craiova Treaty, when the departure of all the Bulgarians could have been achieved and all the Romanians living in Bulgaria could have been brought to Romania. At that time (April 1941), the «problem» of Romanians living in Yugoslavia could also have been solved. Manuilă believed that Romania's system of alliances should be used in order to solve problems confronting population policy: «We have minorities belonging to both external forces between which fate has laid us. Gravitating to the policy of one of them, we shall be able to do everything in order to solve the minority problem

¹⁸ ANIC, *Fond Sabin Manuilă*, dos. XII/195 («Politica de populație»); for the part falling within our scope, see pp. 5-7.

¹⁹ ANIC, *Fond Sabin Manuilă*, dos. XII/204 («Politica de populație a României»).

concerning the other power»²⁰. In other words, the alliance with Germany was to be used by Romania to solve population problems relating to countries at war with Germany (Yugoslavia first, and then the Soviet Union).

Here Manuilă proposed the creation of a «Bio-Political Academy». Among its tasks, the Academy would elaborate a «technical handbook» on population problems. Given the importance of population policy, Manuilă suggested that the Cabinet should appoint a minister to coordinate the activities in this field.

The population policy project of Sabin Manuilă from 15 October 1941 was, therefore, the result of long reflection and was preceded by a series of major writings on minority issues.

Of course, the international context played an important role in Sabin Manuilă's thinking and in the adopting of this idea in the policy of the Romanian state. I refer to the spread of the preoccupation with ethnic homogenization demonstrated by the countries in the region, as well as to the population displacements occurring here beginning with 1939. Population movements taking place in Central and Eastern Europe during and immediately after World War II demonstrate how common the idea of the 'unmixing' of peoples had become²¹. Manuilă's project should be seen in the context of similar projects drawn up in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The population policy project elaborated by Sabin Manuilă and directed to Marshal Ion Antonescu on October 15, 1941, was a complex one. The starting point was the proposition that the only solution to the ethnic problems of Romania, including their implications for relations with neighboring countries, was ethnic homogeneity. The government needed to recover the pre-1940 borders and pursue the ethnic homogenization of the country as well. The national ideal, writes Manuilă must be an «ethnically homogene-

²⁰ ANIC, *Fond Sabin Manuilă*, dos. XII/213, p. 1.

²¹ Important early works on forced population displacements in Central and Eastern Europe include J.B. SCHEFFTMAN, *European Population Transfers, 1917-1947*, New York 1948; E.M. KULISCHER, *Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes, 1917-1947*, New York 1948; and G. RHODE, *Völker auf dem Wege ... Verschiebung der Bevölkerung in Ostdeutschland und in Osteuropa seit 1917*, Kiel 1952. See also H. LEMBERG, «*Ethnische Säuberung*»: Ein Mittel zur Lösung von Nationalitätenproblemen?, in «Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte», Beilage zur Wochenzeitung «Das Parlament», B 46/92, 6.11.1992, pp. 27-38; and N.M. NAIMARK, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Cambridge MA 2001.

ous Romania [România etnicește omogenă] that would encompass all the Romanians», or a «Romanian Romania», a country in which political and ethnic borders could coincide. Ethnic homogenization could be attained forcing all «ethnic minorities with centrifugal tendencies» («minorități etnice cu tendințe centrifugale») over the border and by bringing all «the Romanians by blood» («Români de sânge») into the country. A total and compulsory exchange of population with the neighboring countries had to be undertaken.

Manuilă believed that «politically speaking, the time [for ethnic homogenization] has come, or is very near». When speaking of favorable circumstances Manuilă no doubt had in mind the political situation of Romania in the autumn of 1941. Romania was an ally of Germany in the war against the USSR. It had already recovered Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, the territories occupied by the Soviets in 1940. Both Yugoslavia and Ukraine, countries that would be affected by the population displacements put forward by Manuilă, were under the military occupation of Germany and Romania (the territory between the Dniester and the Bug, Transnistria). In fact, the paper suggested Yugoslavia as a starting point for operations. Two years of forced population movements since the outbreak of the war constituted precedents, that made the idea politically more acceptable. Finally, Romania was within Germany's the sphere of influence, and the German concept of the new order included the idea of homogeneous states.

The geographical theater was to be Greater Romania, within the borders from before the territorial losses of 1940. The latter were to be revised based on strategic and ethnic interests (the latter taking into account the ratio between inflow and outflow to a certain extent). Romania was even to cede certain territories: the northern part of the counties of Hotin (in Bessarabia), and Cernăuți and Storoiineț (in Bukovina) to Ukraine; the strip of land at the northwestern border of the country (in Crișana), including the towns of Salonta, Oradea, Carci, and Satu-Mare, with a dense Hungarian population, as well as the northwestern corner of Timiș-Torontal county (in the Banat) to Hungary. For strategic reasons Romania was to annex a corner of Pokutia²² (a territory which before 1939 had belonged to Poland

²² «Pokutia» is the historic name of the interwar Polish region of Kosów. In the 1920s negotiations were carried out between Romania and Poland for a possible exchange of territories that would ensure the strategic link between Bukovina and Maramureș. The Romanian party requested the southern end of the Kosów region, a strip of land between Romania and Czechoslovakia linking the two territories. See F. ANGHEL, *Despre o problemă aproape necunoscută: frontiera româno-polonă în perioada interbelică, 1918-1939*, in «Revista istorică», 8, 1997, 3-4, pp. 255-270.

and after that year was part of the General Government) as well as a small portion of Subcarpathian Rus' (which had belonged to interwar Czechoslovakia and which in 1939 was annexed to Hungary). This annexation would have enabled it to control the Sniatyn – Delatyn – Frasin – Sighet railway, linking Bukovina to northern Transylvania. From Hungary proper, Romania was to annex the town of Békéscsaba. From Cadrilater, belonging to Bulgaria since 1940, Romania was to receive a part of Caliacra County (the Balcic district and part of the Ezibei district, i.e., the Black Sea littoral) as well as a narrow strip of land along the Danube including the towns of Silistra and Turtucaia. These border rectifications partly stemmed from older ideas contemplated by the Romanian Government during the interwar period. Future Romania was to have a surface of 290,126.5 sq. km (as compared to the 295,049 sq. km held by Greater Romania, the 194,756 sq. km held by Romania after the territorial losses of 1940, or the 245,885 sq. km held by Romania in October 1941).

The program was to be carried out in several stages. The total and compulsory exchange was to be made with all neighboring countries, carried out in a succession of steps that took into account the fact that the population exchange with one country had a direct impact on others.

The population exchange between Romania and Yugoslavia aimed at the evacuation of all the Serbs from the Romanian Banat (42,472 individuals), and the bringing over into Romania of the Romanians from the Serbian Banat (67,897), and those from the Timok²¹, in northeastern Serbia (ca. 400,000), in total approximately 467,897 individuals.

The population exchange between Romania and Bulgaria was to precede the recovery of parts of Cadrilater by Romania. Beside the population living in this territory, all the Bulgarians of Romania (179,046 individuals) were to leave: the Bulgarians living in the Banat (10,012), in Bessarabia (136,726), as well as those living in Wallachia and Moldavia (5,308). Bulgaria was to cede approximately 85,000 Romanians living in the Vidin region and in the Danube valley to Romania. The part of Cadrilater ceded by Bulgaria was to be compensated to the detriment of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria annexing an equivalent territory in the Timok region, from which the Romanians would have already been evacuated, as indicated above.

The population exchange with Hungary was to correspond with the border proposed by Sabin Manuilă. As the number of Hungarians leaving Romania

²¹ Timok, situated in northeastern Serbia, had a dense Romanian population.

Map: Romania, October 1941



█ Borders of Romania before 1940

- - - Borders of Romania, October 1941

— International borders, October 1941

Bukovina Provinces and regions mentioned by Manuilă

Cernăuți Bălci

Counties and districts mentioned by Manuilă

• Sighet

▪ Cluj

Provinces and regions mentioned by Manuilă

Counties and districts mentioned by Manuilă

Settlements mentioned by Manuilă

Other settlements

would have been greater than that of the Romanians arriving from Hungary (1,353,276 Hungarians versus 181,971 Romanians from the frontier region and 44,688 from Hungary proper), Hungary was to receive more territory than just what Romania would cede: more precisely Pokutia (the Ruthenian or Ukrainian population of which would have been colonized in Transnistria) and the Serbian Banat (possibly without a narrow strip of land next to Belgrade). Approximately 502,415 Serbs would have to depart from the Bačka and the Serbian Banat in order to make room for the Hungarians. These Serbs would settle in Timok, to replace the Romanians who went to Transylvania. Romania would facilitate the resettlement of Hungarians by ceding the northwestern corner of Timiș-Torontal County.

In the last stage of the population exchange, the Russians and the Ukrainians living in Romania (primarily Bessarabia and Bukovina), numbering 991,265 individuals, were to be exchanged for the Romanians living across the Dniester (in the occupied USSR), estimated by Manuilă to number 800,000 individuals. This relocation would also have affected the approximately 60,000 Ukrainians from Pokutia, which was to be incorporated into Romania. The border rectification in the counties of Cernăuți and Hotin was to compensate for this part of Pokutia.

As observed, the regional impact was taken into consideration: certain operations affected other countries beside those making the population exchange. The loss incurred by Bulgaria when ceding approximately one third of Cadrilater to Romania was to be compensated to the detriment of Yugoslavia with Timok, deserted by the Romanians. Hungary was to gain other territories from Yugoslavia beside the Bačka, already in its possession from April 1941, namely the Serbian Banat, possibly minus a strip of land near Belgrade. In order to make room for the Hungarians evacuated from Transylvania, the Serbs of the Bačka and the Serbian Banat were to be relocated to the Timok region, deserted by the Romanians. In order to make room for the Hungarians deported from eastern Transylvania (the Szeklers), the Ruthenians of the Forested Carpathians (Pokutia) were to be relocated to Transnistria. The settlement was to be made at the expense of Yugoslavia, «that would only lose a territory inhabited by minorities». It becomes evident that unequal population exchanges were accompanied by territorial correction; it becomes equally evident that Manuilă here expressed a principle outlined by the Romanian party during negotiations with Hungary in 1940.

The issue of the minorities not manifesting «centrifugal tendencies» could not be solved by population exchanges. Manuilă's project offers only a

general solution, without any concrete plan of action. As to the Germans (namely the Saxons of Transylvania and the Swabians of the Banat), Manuilă argued that many considerations pleaded for their repatriation to the Reich at the end of the war. Manuilă surely had in mind the precedent of the repatriation of ethnic Germans – at Nazi Germany's own request – from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dobrudja. Romanian Turks were to benefit from «a gradual transfer operated by the Turkish government», a reference to a convention signed by the Romanian and Turkish governments on September 4, 1936 that mentioned the possibility of a voluntary emigration of the Moslem Turkish minority living in Dobrudja. The convention had remained in effect, and by April 15, 1941 70,000 ethnic Turks had already left²⁴.

It is quite obvious that no exchange or «repatriation» could be contemplated in the case of the Jewish and Gypsy populations. Manuilă speaks of a «unilateral transfer»: «The Jewish problem and the Gypsy problem fall beyond the scope of the population exchange solutions, being unilateral transfers; they will be approached in a special memorandum». We have not discovered the document to which Manuilă referred, but without doubt «unilateral transfer» meant forced emigration. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, we cannot say whether Manuilă had in mind their emigration to Palestine (or elsewhere), or their deportation to Transnistria. Since deportations of the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina beyond the Dniester had already begun in September 1941, it is not out of the question that Manuilă had this in mind. We can infer that Manuilă's idea corresponded to that shared by political circles in many countries then, namely the emigration of the Jewish population to whatever countries would accept them. The Antonescu government as well felt that the «Jewish question» could be solved solely by emigration, preferably to Palestine.

Manuilă's quantitative estimates were based largely on the Romanian census of 1930; Manuilă was himself then director of the Institute of Census and Statistics and saw to it that the census offered an accurate ethnic picture of the country at that time. When speaking of the population of the future state within the borders considered in the project we are discussing, the author did not overlook the estimated population growth of Romania between 1930 and 1941, some 2,000,000 or so. As to the Romanians living in neighboring countries, Manuilă's figures are necessarily less precise. For the Romanians living in the Soviet Union, he gives some 800,000 individuals, though representatives of the Central Institute of Statistics who took a

²⁴ D. GHIERASIM, *Schimbul de populații*, pp. 69-72.

census of the Romanians in the Soviet territories in 1942-1943, in order to prepare for their repatriation to Romania, found only 400,000 (ca. 250,000 in Transnistria and 150,000 east of the Bug). Figures for other Romanian communities abroad are, however, quite accurate. They are in some cases higher than the official census data, because the censuses organized in respective countries likely undercounted the minorities. These figures circulated in various Romanian and foreign publications.

Consequently, according to Sabin Manuilă's project, 3,581,618 individuals belonging to the minorities were to leave Romania (with the borders contemplated by Manuilă): 42,427 Serbs; 179,046 Bulgarians; 1,353,276 Hungarians; 991,265 Ukrainians and Russians; 756,930 Jews; 60,000 Ukrainians from Pokutia (i.e., outside the old Romania); and 198,629 Poles and Czechoslovaks. At the same time, 1,602,359 Romanians living in neighboring countries were to be brought into Romania: 85,000 from Bulgaria; 467,897 from Yugoslavia; 44,688 from Hungary; 800,000 from the USSR; 200,000 from Macedonia; and 4,774 from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Future Romania would have had a surface of 290,126.5 sq. km (compared to the 295,049 of Greater Romania) and a population of 18,036,087 (as compared to the 18,057,028 inhabitants of Greater Romania in 1930). The population, taking the demographic growth of 1930-1941 into account, would have included 16,402,966 Romanians (90.9% of the total), 819,963 Germans (4.5%), 194,604 Turks and Tatars (1.1%), and 618,554 individuals of other nationalities (3.4%). If the minorities had held a share of 28.1% in Greater Romania, in Manuilă's project they would have accounted for only 9.1%. These figures would have changed further after the departure of the Germans, the Turks (and Tatars), and the Gypsies (included under «Others»). Then the share held by the Romanians would have been almost 100%.

It becomes evident that the ethnic homogenization of Romania within the borders contemplated by Sabin Manuilă involved a series of resettlements; approximately six million people were to be displaced. The implementation of the project would have eliminated minority enclaves from the territory of Romania, as well as the ethnically Romanian enclaves in neighboring countries.

We should note that (with minor exceptions) Manuilă's project was limited to ethnically Romanian space. The project did not contemplate either the annexation of Transnistria (claimed by some voices in Romania during the first months after the outbreak of the war against the USSR) or that of the Yugoslav Banat (also claimed by some at that time). The alteration of the

old ethnic and state borders, as anticipated by Manuilă, would have been based partly on strategic considerations; in cases where a change in the ethnic border would have worked to the disadvantage of the Romanians strategic arguments were indeed adduced. Nevertheless, the plan stressed border adjustments, not territorial annexations.

In this respect Manuilă's project radically differed from some Romanian projects of the time, which proposed the annexation of territories mainly inhabited by other peoples, and from projects elaborated in other countries that targeted the radical modification of the ethnic composition of vast territories. Manuilă's project did not reflect expansionist ambitions. Similarly, Manuilă's project was not racist as was the case with the Germans' *Generalplan Ost*. In his project Manuilă does not even invoke ideas of racist nature. Even less did the project exhibit any genocidal character. We have little reason to suspect that in Manuilă's thinking the «unilateral transfer» of the Jews and Gypsies meant the physical destruction of these groups – as would in fact partially happen in Transnistria, to where the Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina, and a portion of the Gypsies from throughout Romania would be deported. Undoubtedly, Manuilă's project is comparable to other projects of population policy drawn up in or for this part of Europe during World War II. But it differs from most of them, in particularly for its non-imperialistic character.

Although dealing with the entire range of population issues, Manuilă's project was – as the author wrote – only a draft. In terms of detail it cannot be compared with the project of the Romanian-Russian-Ukrainian population exchange elaborated by the government in 1943; the latter addressed more specifics, including issues of international law. Manuilă's project did not become *stricto sensu* an official program of the Antonescu government. In fact there existed no text which could have formally been adopted by the government as a program. However, the policy of the Romanian State between 1941 and 1944 toward ethnic minorities and toward Romanians living abroad was in large part in unison with Manuilă's ideas.

The scenario elaborated by Sabin Manuilă and the policy of ethnic homogenization of the Antonescu government materialized only to a minor degree. This was due not only to the financial and logistical difficulties of such an undertaking during wartime. The population exchanges and transfers also hinged on external factors: agreements with neighboring countries, Germany's consent to the territorial and ethnic changes in its area of domination, some certainty that the changes would be recognized if the

Western allies won the war, and others. Nor was government policy always consistent: the approach changed with circumstances.

Only a few minor transfers were ever completed: the repatriation of a part of the Hungarian-speaking population of Moldavia (Csangós); the continuation of Turkish emigration from Dobrudja; the colonization in Bessarabia and Bukovina (on the land of the ethnic Germans repatriated in 1940) of several thousand Romanians displaced from Cadrilater; the repatriation of several groups of ethnic Romanians from the occupied Soviet territories²⁵. The deportation of the Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina and part of the Gypsy population to Transnistria were also part of the policy of ethnic homogenization.

The great population exchanges with neighboring countries, in which many hundreds of thousands, and in some cases more than one million, people should have been involved, did not occur. After the end of the war and during the first postwar years, Romania did not apply measures of ethnic cleansing, unlike some other East-European countries. This was due first to international circumstances; but it was also due to the solutions the post-Antonescu governments found for the issue of the ethnic minorities in the country. But that is a different chapter in Romanian ethnic history.

²⁵ Concise information on these aspects in J.B. SCHECHTMAN, *European Population Transfers, passim*; and D. BANCOȘ, *Social și național, passim*.

The Memorandum of Sabin Manuila to Marshal Ion Antonescu

15 October 1941

His Excellency

Marshall Ion Antonescu, Head of the Romanian State

Mr. Marshall,

The audience you so graciously granted me at Tighina¹ gave me the full conviction that the road on which you have been leading the destiny of the Romanian nation is the one I have always considered in my inner soul to be the most treasured ideal of our nation. As soon as you had graciously formulated the conception, which animates you and which escapes the power of understanding of most of our contemporaries, I realized that you are pursuing a great ideal, the accomplishment of which will cause great suffering to our generation and will force us to make efforts unprecedented in the history of the Romanians.

I am deeply grateful for the honor you did me when sharing thoughts and, based on the fundamental ideas that I hope I have understood correctly, I have felt obliged to make the first draft of a project that may illustrate the technical framework of the question of the population exchanges in which Romania is interested.

Two basic arguments recommend the population exchange method as the ideal solution, namely: 1) the recovery of Transylvania would not rule out the issue [of Transylvania] from the future Romanian-Hungarian discussions or from the claims of the Hungarians. The recovery of Transylvania, by any possible means, would fill the souls of all Romanians with joy. However, it would not consolidate our position in Transylvania in a definitive manner; 2) the war with Hungary would be the bloodiest of all wars in Europe. The Hungarians are as fanatic as we are, and we would wage a war of extermination. Such a war would cause heavy casualties and incalculable material losses that, rather than affect the army alone, would especially extend to the civilian population.

A population exchange, however painful, does not involve the same degree of sacrifice that accompanies a war, especially a terrible war.

Translated by V. Achim from the archive original (Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, Bucharest, *Fond Sabin Manuila*, dos. XII/211, pp. 1-10). The Romanian text was published in S. BOLOVAN - I. BOLOVAN, *Problemele demografice ale Transilvaniei între știință și politică (1920-1945)*. *Studiu de caz*, in C. MUREȘAN (ed.), *Transilvania între medieval și modern*, Cluj-Napoca 1996, pp. 125-131, with minor errors. All footnotes are the translator's.

¹ Now in the Republic of Moldova.

For it is quite understood that a population exchange calls for extraordinary efforts and causes innumerable sufferings.

It is a matter that without a doubt concerns millions of people, the fate of whom is placed in the hands of the State. The highest capacity of organization and an unlimited devotion may lessen the infinite pain caused by the uprooting of millions of people, but cannot eliminate it altogether.

However, the only solution that could prevent future wars, even the one desired by the entire Romanian nation today, is to carry out a total exchange of populations, which would make any future war pointless. Total exchange is possible owing to the low standards of the Romanian population and of the other peoples.

Nevertheless, should we reach the heroic decision to make a total exchange of populations, the entire nation would have to devote itself to this great work; and, for a generation, all the country's efforts would have to be doubled and focused exclusively on the work of consolidation of our brothers, whom we would uproot from the regions in which they were born and to which they are tied with all their souls and with all their interests.

Fully aware of all the difficulties, but also of the historical importance of this task, we have to take steps toward accomplishing the ideal of creating the future Romania.

The ideal of an ethnically homogeneous Romania, encompassing all the Romanians, with no exception, has been impossible to realize so far; it has also seemed unlikely ever to be realized in the future.

This ideal, our true national ideal, can only be realized now, through the instrumentality of favorable historic circumstances, and under your providential leadership.

Politically, the time has come, or is very near, for an operation of considerable proportions, which would consist in removing across the border all the minorities with centrifugal tendencies from the future territory of Romanian Romania, bringing into the country all the Romanians by blood, from wherever they may reside, and establishing the new borders of Romanian Romania, of eternal Romania, so that political borders and ethnical limits should accurately coincide.

What these borders will be is not difficult to determine by a correlation of statistic and strategic elements.

The minority populations with centrifugal tendencies are the following: 1) the Hungarians; 2) the Russians and Ukrainians; 3) the Bulgarians; and 4) the Serbs.

All these minorities should disappear from the territory of Romania. At the same time, the Romanian elements from the neighboring countries should be relocated to Romania.

A total and compulsory exchange of population is imperative.

However, although the exchange is termed total, in order to simplify the exchange technique, there is no danger in admitting a few exceptions of great economic importance and minimal demographic importance. These exceptions are as follows:

1) Foreigners in Romania and Romanians abroad should be allowed to stay in place if they are past the reproduction age. Their presence, within and without, is detrimental neither to the cause nor to the idea. No further follow-up is required in their case, since their disappearance will occur gradually. Nevertheless, the liquidation of their assets will facilitate the exchange of properties, by compensation.

2) The wealthiest people in a village, as far as 1% or 2%, may be allowed to stay on. The optional but definitive repatriation of their children should nevertheless be provided for. Succession and transfer of assets could be regulated by special conventions.

Such concessions should not be made in localities lying in the border area, where the exchange should be total and compulsory.

The geographic framework of population exchange operations should be Greater Romania, with its borders as before the territorial losses of 1940. This does not imply that we claim the integrity of our former borders, but rather that the very logic of things requires that the borders of 1940 should be subjected to revision based on both strategic and ethnic principles.

1) In the East, such revision would logically maintain the natural line of the Dniester, with an exchange of territories in the northern regions of the counties of Hotin², Cernăuți³, Storojineț⁴, and Maramureș, in order to acquire a strategic border.

2) In the West, the border would descend to the margin of Țara Oașului, west of Seini, Baia-Mare, Șimleul [Silvaniei], and Cehul Silvaniei, descending to Tileagd and from here to the south of Salonta, then would follow along the present border to the Mureș River, and cede the northwestern corner of Timiș-Torontal County.

[3]) In the South, the revision would retain from Caliacra County the Balcic⁵ district and part of the Ezibei⁶ district, and a narrow strip of land south of Silistra⁷ – Turtucaia⁸ along the Danube.

² Hotin, now Khotyn in Ukraine.

³ Cernăuți, now Chernivtsi in Ukraine.

⁴ Storojineț, now Storozhynets' in Ukraine.

⁵ Balcic, now Baltik in Bulgaria.

⁶ Ezibei, now Paskalevo in Bulgaria.

⁷ Now in Bulgaria.

⁸ Turtucaia, now Tutrakan in Bulgaria.

Should these principles be accepted, establishing the border would be purely administrative in nature. However, at the same time, the population exchange would involve a far-reaching operation of exceptional social and economic character.

Beside the aforementioned territorial cessions, several strategic necessities also naturally arise, that is territorial annexations, such as the acquisition by Romania of the Sniatyn⁹ – Delatyn¹⁰ – Frasin¹¹ – Sighet railroad along with the wooded corner of Pokutia. Additionally, we shall have to demand annexation of the town of Békéscsaba from Hungary, in compensation to the ceded border towns and as an essential strategic and economic center. The town has an absolute majority of Slovaks, the repatriation of whom would be an easily solvable problem.

The occupation of Yugoslavia and Ukraine by the German troops has made population exchange operations a present interest. Yugoslavia has always been a mute point in the population policy of the Romanian nation. However, Yugoslavia now offers a starting point that may launch the fulfillment of our national ideal.

The total exchange of populations should be made in several steps.

Step 1. On the present territory of Romania, in the counties of Timiș[-Torontal], Caraș, Severin, and Arad, there is a total number of 42,472 Serbs (1930 census). This minority group, albeit insignificant in number, has an important part to play in Yugoslav plans of expansion. The general public in Yugoslavia has constantly raised claims to the Romanian Banat. When the Soviets robbed Bessarabia and Bukovina from us, the Serbian press not only found excuses for the cession of a piece of land with an absolute majority of Romanians, but reformulated the old claims of Yugoslavia to the entire Banat as well. In order to eliminate any Serbian pretensions to the Banat, however fanciful these pretensions may be, the first law of Romanian population policy should be the immediate evacuation of all the Serbs from the Romanian Banat.

Such a measure would also trigger, of course, the evacuation of 67,897 Romanians from the Serbian Banat, and of ca. 400,000 Romanians from the Serbian Timok¹² (data of 1921; in accordance with the official Yugoslav statistics of 1921, the total number of Romanians residing in Yugoslavia would be 231,168 people).

To expatriate 42,472 Serbs (1930) and bring 467,897 Romanians into the country is not a population exchange. It results that the operation should be closely related to Steps 2 and 3 in the population exchange pursued by our state.

⁹ Now Sniatyn in Ukraine.

¹⁰ Now Delyatyn in Ukraine.

¹¹ The Romanian form for the former (before 1938/39) Czechoslovakian/Slovakian town Jasina or Jasište. In 1941 it belonged to Hungary and was called Kőrösmező. Now it is known as Yasinya, in Ukraine.

¹² Timok is a region situated in northeastern Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Step 2 consists in recuperating part of our Cadrilater¹³, namely, the area indicated in the proposals of the Romanian government in Berlin and Rome in 1940.

The Bulgarians should be evacuated from these areas by the Bulgarian government, and settled in the valleys of the Danube and of the Timok. In Timok, Bulgaria would be compensated at the expense of Yugoslavia. Bulgaria will have to cede to us the Romanians from the Vidin region and the valley of the Danube, so that we may fill the vacuum left by the Bulgarians who will have left Cadrilater. In practice, the Romanians from Bulgaria should not be transferred into Cadrilater, but rather into Transylvania, from where the Hungarian population will have been evacuated.

On the occasion, Romania would also be able to cede to Bulgaria the Bulgarians from the Banat (10,012), from Bessarabia (137,726 in 1930), as well as all the Bulgarian colonists brought to Wallachia and Moldavia in the nineteenth century, who continue to declare themselves of Bulgarian origin (5,308 in 1930).

In this way, Bulgaria would incur no losses, either in number of inhabitants or in territory, and Romania would gain in both senses. What is more, a latent conflict would thus be liquidated once and for all, one not apparent nowadays because of the international political configuration, but one that we can certainly foresee arising at the first occasion, in the event of an armed conflict between the Bulgarians and any of their neighbors, with no interference from the great powers (a Turkish-Bulgarian, Greek-Bulgarian, or Serbian-Bulgarian conflict).

Though it is unlikely that the Bulgarian policy makers would accept such a proposal of their own will, the statistic evidence should be fairly convincing. We should also stress the argument that the solution represented by the present «eternal peace» between Romania and Bulgaria did not as much derive from a consensus between both parties, as from constraints imposed on one of the «contractual» parties, which in the long term lessens the moral value of the obligations imposed on us by the force of circumstances in 1940.

This population exchange will divide Cadrilater into two: 5,038 sq. km left to Bulgaria and 2,416 sq. km to be cleared of Bulgarian population and returned to Romania. The division of Cadrilater would be made in the proportion of 67.6% versus 32.4% in favor of Bulgaria.

The exchange would have the following outcome: the departure of all the Bulgarians from Romania (Banat, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, 179,046 Bulgarians in total), and the repatriation of approximately 85,000 Romanians, who are still living in Bulgaria nowadays, but whom the Bulgarian statistics did not indicate as such at the latest census.

¹³ Cadrilater (Quadrilateral) is the Romanian name for southern Dobrudja.

The territory ceded by Bulgaria from Cadrilater would be compensated in the northwestern corner of Bulgaria by annexation of a corresponding territory from the valley of the Timok, from which the Romanians would be evacuated.

You may wish to consider the opportunity of raising the Bulgarian question at the very beginning of the negotiations.

Step 3 of the population exchange naturally derives from the need for placing the Romanian population evacuated from Yugoslavia in the Transylvanian territory now under Hungarian occupation. Indeed, we would be withdrawing approximately 467,897 Romanians from Yugoslavia (data of 1921; the exact figure can only be provided by a census in Timok).

For the Romanians evacuated from Yugoslavia to be settled in Transylvania, it is imperative that the Hungarians should evacuate the territories under Romanian claim.

The Romanians evacuated from Timok and sent to Transylvania could be replaced with Serbs from the Bačka and the Banat, a number of approximately 502,415 people (in 1921). The Serbs' departure from the Bačka and the Banat would create a considerable vacuum, which could be filled with Hungarians from Transylvania. Romania could increase the colonization opportunities of the Hungarians by ceding the northwestern corner of Timiș-Torontal County.

The Hungarians are still colonizing the area of the Bačka nowadays. Perhaps 600,000 Hungarians could be settled in the entire area of Bačka – Banat (with Yugoslavia possibly preserving a strip of land from the Banat, next to Belgrade).

North of the Mureș River, up to Maramureș, the border rectification would provide Hungary with an additional 5,812.5 sq. km in the border area (including the towns of Salonta, Oradea, Carei, and Satu-Mare) with a population of 482,611 people, among them 181,921 Romanians who would leave in their turn so as to achieve the homogenization of the entire border area between Hungary and Romania. By this change of border, out of the 1,353,276 Hungarians living in Transylvania, 600,000 would be placed in Bačka – Banat, 225,708 would be allowed to stay on in the Oradea – Satu-Mare¹⁴ border area, and 181,971 would replace the Romanians withdrawn from the western border. A total of 345,579 Hungarians would remain to be resettled later.

The ideal solution for the placing of this Hungarian population would be the colonization of the Ruthenians from the Forested Carpathians in Transnistria, to replace Romanians who would be repatriated to Romania. The Forested Carpathians in all respects are like the Szekler region. The resettlement of the Szeklers in this area would remove the Ukrainians from the Tisza Plain, thus creating a Hungarian-Ukrainian ethnic border along the summit of the Northeastern Carpathians; it

¹⁴ The name appears in the form «Sătmar».

would also settle the Szekler question, which led to the unnatural solution of Vienna, by which Hungary was assigned a region of eight large counties with Romanian¹⁵ majorities only in order to be able to attach to Hungary three small and sparsely populated counties with Hungarian majorities, a solution that cannot be maintained or even justified.

A large number of German specialists to whom I made this argument admitted that the Vienna Award reflected considerations of political opportunity rather than of common sense. None of them even tried to explain this arbitrary decision.

As a conclusion, the solutions put forward here would settle: 1) the Dobrudja question; 2) the question of the Bulgarians of Romania and Bessarabia, the latter under Soviet occupation at the moment of the Craiova Conference; 3) the question of the Romanians of Bulgaria, by providing Bulgaria with more territory and population than it has nowadays, and by removing all the Romanians from Bulgaria and all the Bulgarians from Romania; 4) the question of the Romanians of Timok and of the Serbian Banat; 5) the question of the Serbs of Romania; 6) the question of the Hungarians of Yugoslavia; 7) the question of the Serbs of Hungary; 8) the question of the Hungarians of Transylvania; 9) the question of the Ruthenians from the [Forested] Carpathians; and, 10) the question of Transylvania and of the Romanians of Hungary.

The issue of the population exchange will only be brought to a conclusion after the total Romanian-Russian-Ukrainian exchange is made.

The solution of all these major questions would be made with little territorial sacrifices and would foster a genuine climate of pacification in the Danube basin.

The settlement of the conflicts would be made to the detriment of Yugoslavia, which, having lost a war, would only lose a territory inhabited by minorities. Romania would receive 2,416 sq. km from the Bulgarians and nothing from the Serbs. The Romanian-Serbian disagreement would thus be solved by withdrawal of all co-nationals from the respective countries. Romania would preserve its ancient border with Yugoslavia. Serbia's place in the Banat would be taken by Hungary, which would neighbor Romania over a much larger distance. The status of Yugoslavia would be given a permanent solution at the Peace Conference.

A permanent solution would be thus given to the conflict with Hungary, which would receive all the Hungarians of Romania. Hungary would obtain the Banat and the Bačka from Yugoslavia; the Forested Carpathians, cleared of Ruthenians, would become the new Szekler Land. Romania would have only one neighbor to the west: Hungary. Hungary would have an ethnical control over the tops of the Northeastern Carpathians and become a country with a sound ethnic basis. The Ukrainians of Hungary would be colonized by us in Transnistria, together with the Ukrainians of Pokutia and of Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Hungarians

¹⁵ In the original, «Hungarian» [sic].

would additionally receive a part of the Romanian Banat and the area inhabited by Hungarians in Crişana. The Romanians of Timok would be colonized in the Szekler Land, and those of the Serbian Banat in Transylvania, Crişana, Banat, and Cadrilater. In exchange for this, the Romanians would obtain the advanced position of Békéscsaba, with a Slovak population, and the Romanian villages of Kétegyháza¹⁶ and Elek¹⁷. The Hungarians of Békéscsaba would be exchanged for the Romanians of Gyula, Oradea, Carei, and Satu-Mare.

In Step 4 of the total exchange of populations, the Russians and the Ukrainians would be exchanged for the Romanians living on the left bank of the Dniester, with a rectification of the border of 816 sq. km in the counties of Cernăuţi and Hotin, in compensation for the Sniatyn – Frasin – Sighet line, which would imply the gain of a surface of 5,704 sq. km and the building of a railroad of 80 km.

The problem of other minorities cannot be taken up at present. Therefore, the question of the Germans (Saxons and Swabians) would be settled at the end of the war. Everything pleads for their repatriation to the future Germany (Step 5).

The problem of the Turks will be given a definitive solution by gradual transfer, operated by the Turkish government (Step 6).

The Jewish problem and the Gypsy problem fall beyond the scope of the population exchange solutions, being unilateral transfers; they will be approached in a special memorandum (Step 7).

The balance of the population exchange and border changes would be as follows:

<i>Surface of Greater Romania</i>	295,049	sq. km
Territory ceded from Cadrilater	5,038	sq. km
Territory received from or ceded to Yugoslavia	–	
Territory ceded to Hungary	5,812.5	sq. km
Territory received from Hungary	1,040	sq. km
Territory received from Poland [and] Czechoslovakia	5,704	sq. km
Territory ceded to Ukraine	816	sq. km
	Ceded in total	11,666.5 sq. km
	Received in total	6,744.0 sq. km
	Effective loss	4,922.5 sq. km
<i>Surface of future Romania</i>	290,126.5	sq. km

¹⁶ In the original this name appears in its Romanian form: Chitigaz.

¹⁷ In the original this name appears in its Romanian form: Aletea.

Population of Greater Romania in 1930

	18,057,028	inhabitants
Romanians	12,981,324	or 71.9%
Hungarians	1,425,507	or 7.9%
Germans	745,421	or 4.1%
Russians [and] Ukrainians	991,265	or 5.5%
Serbs	51,062	or 0.3%
Bulgarians	366,384	or 2.0%
Jews	756,930	or 4.2%
Turks [and] Tatars	176,913	or 1.0%
Others	562,322	or 3.1%

*Changes due to population exchange:**Leaving the country:*

Serbs	42,427
Bulgarians	179,046
Hungarians	1,353,276
Ruthenians [and] Russians	991,265
Jews (Mosaic)	756,930
Ukrainians (Pokutia)	60,000
Poles [and] Czechoslovaks	198,629
Leaving in total	3,581,618

Romanians coming to the country from:

Bulgaria	ca. 85,000	(estimate based on data in 1910)
Yugoslavia	ca. 467,897	(estimate based on data in 1921)
Hungary	ca. 44,688	(estimate based on data in 1910)
Russia	ca. 800,000	(estimate)
Macedonia	ca. 200,000	(estimate)
Poland [and] Czechoslovakia	ca. 4,774	
Romanians coming to the country		1,602,359
Difference in deficit		1,979,059 people

The probable surplus of population between 1930 and 1941 is of 2,000,000 people.

Therefore, the probable population of future Romania will be 18,036,087 people, of whom:

Romanians	16,402,966	or 90.9%
Germans	819,963	or 4.5%
Turks [and] Tatars	194,604	or 1.1%
Others	618,554	or 3.4%